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Summary
This chapter1 argues that rights are shaped through actual struggles
informed by people’s own understandings of what they are justly
entitled to. Examining rights from the perspective of actual struggles
makes it possible for analysis to transcend accepted normative para-
meters of human rights debates, question established conceptual
categories and expand the range of claims that are validated as rights.
The chapter draws out these ‘actor-oriented perspectives’ in the course
of reviewing key debates in the field of international human rights to
show how they question underlying assumptions in these debates, and
offer the possibility of breaking through the impasse that some of them
have reached. 
Introduction: What does an actor-oriented
perspective mean?
Actor-oriented perspectives are based on the recognition that rights are
shaped through actual struggles informed by people’s own under-
standings of what they are justly entitled to. They imply an approach to
needs, rights and priorities that is informed by the concrete experiences
of the particular actors who are involved in, and who stand to gain
directly from, the struggles in question. The understanding of actor-
oriented perspectives in this chapter is drawn in part from a legal
literature that does not necessarily position itself within the human
rights tradition, but which calls for an evaluation of legal principles in
terms of their particular effects in a social setting, rather than only in
terms of the conceptual coherence of abstract principles.2 It goes beyond
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a call for attention to context to an emphasis on consequences for less
powerful groups and/or individuals in society. To quote one of the
contributors to this literature: ‘When we ask ourselves whether a social
or legal practice works, we must ask ourselves, “works for whom?” Who
benefits and who loses from existing political, economic, and legal
structures?’ (Singer 1990, p. 1841).
Such an approach thus explicitly acknowledges the reality of power
differences and hierarchical relationships in society, and points to the
need to look beyond abstract formal equality principles to the effect of
those principles in entrenching or challenging hierarchy from the
perspective of the subordinated (Matsuda 1990, p. 1768; Minow and
Spelman 1990, p. 1650). When people ask the question ‘works for
whom?’ and translate this question into action, they change the terms of
institutionalized understandings of rights and make rights real in their
own context. They use an otherwise legalistic discourse of rights in a
transformative manner that translates it into an effective challenge to
power inequalities. They shift the parameters of the discourse and
expand the possibilities for action. 
The discussion in this chapter is organized around three key debates
that have gone on among legal practitioners and scholars in the field of
human rights: debates about universalist versus relativist views about
rights; about individual versus group rights; and about the hierarchy
versus the indivisibility of rights. The chapter elaborates on each of
these debates and then draws on critical responses to the debates and on
accounts of concrete struggles over rights in order to highlight the ways
in which actor-oriented perspectives challenge the premises underlying
these debates and expand the range of claims that can be validated as rights. 
Universalism versus cultural relativism
Do human rights principles provide a universal standard to be applied
uniformly, or are they contingent on social context? This debate has
characterized the post-Second World War human rights movement
since the enactment of its founding document, the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948, and continues to be intense. I
will map out some of the positions represented on a spectrum that has
‘universalist’ arguments at one end and ‘cultural relativist’ arguments at
the other. 
Universalist arguments
The first type of universalist argument is the normative claim that
human rights should provide a universal standard because rights inhere in
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every human person simply by virtue of being human. Rights flow
from the inherent dignity of every human person. They are not given
by the sovereign and therefore cannot be taken away by a sovereign.
Nor are rights pegged to status based on age, gender, race or caste. This
argument is influenced by the idea of ‘natural rights’ attributed to
natural law theorists such as Kant (Wilson 1997, p. 8). Contemporary
variants of this position can be found in Donnelly (1989), Howard (1992)
and Schachter (1983). 
It also finds expression in international human rights documents such
as the 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights, adopted at the first
United Nations (UN) Conference on Human Rights. The preamble to
the declaration states that ‘all human rights derive from the dignity and
worth inherent in the human person’ and that the UDHR ‘constitutes a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations’. Article
One reinforces this by asserting that ‘human rights and fundamental
freedoms are the birthright of all human beings’ and that the universal
nature of rights and fundamental freedoms ‘is beyond question’. Since
rights flow from the inherent dignity of the human person, they are not
contingent on particularities such as political, social, economic or cultural
context.
The second category of universalist arguments is the formalist one:
since most states have ratified and agreed to be legally bound by
international human rights law, human rights standards are universal. In
addition, some argue, the UDHR, though simply a declaration that is
not legally binding, is such a widely accepted landmark instrument in
human rights that it has (or parts of it have) become customary inter-
national law (Steiner and Alston 2000, p. 367). Customary international
law refers to norms that have evolved from state practice over time,
norms that bind even those states that have not entered into specific
treaties on those aspects of international law: in this case, human rights. 
This argument resonates with Howard’s (1992) contention that
human rights must be seen as universal because even if their Western
origins are acknowledged, most states around the world have adopted
the liberal state framework. This framework makes rights inevitable and
indispensable in regulating state–citizen relations. This category of
argument is not concerned with the legitimacy of human rights
standards; formalist criteria such as the fact of ratification alone, or the
existence of a liberal state framework, will suffice to make the case for
universality.
Multicultural universalism or weak cultural relativism
I refer to this category of arguments as ‘multicultural universalism’ or
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